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Abstract: This paper empirically evaluates the relative importance of embodied versus disembodied idea 
flows in explaining income gaps and idea gaps.  Trade is used as a measure of embodied idea flows and 
telephone call traffic a measure of disembodied flows.  Since both trade and telephone traffic may be 
endogenous, this paper uses the geographic, linguistic, and colonial components of trade and telephone 
traffic as instruments to identify their effects on income and total factor productivity (TFP).   The results 
provide little support for the embodied object models when both trade and telephone traffic are included 
in the regressions.  Telephone traffic has a quantitatively much large effect on income per worker and 
TFP than trade. 
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This paper is an empirical investigation of the relative importance of embodied versus disembodied
idea ﬂows in bridging income gaps { through idea gaps and object gaps; ideas are disembodied
if they are free from any connection with a piece of equipment, and vice versa. The distinction
between \idea gap" and \object gap" in economic development was rst made by Paul Romer
(1993). An idea gap arises because poor countries do not have access to ideas that are used in
industrial nations to generate economic value, whereas an object gap is due to a lack of objects
such as factories, roads, and raw materials.1 Economists disagree on the relative importance of idea
gaps and object gaps in economic development.2 They also disagree on the relative contribution of
embodied and disembodied idea ﬂows in bridging these gaps. This is the issue this paper addresses.
Romer (1993) stresses the importance of embodied idea ﬂows. A large literature, including J.
Bradford De Long and Lawrence H. Summers (1991), has come to regard technology embodied in
machinery and equipment as \the lever of riches."3 The empirical research in the literature thus
far focuses exclusively on the signicant positive contribution of \idea-embodying object ﬂows,"
such as trade and foreign direct investment, in closing income gaps.4 Special types of object ﬂows
notwithstanding, it seems ironic that after downplaying the importance of object gaps, ultimately
the new growth literature has to rely on object ﬂows to close these idea gaps. One reason for
1Therefore, dierent policy prescriptions are called for, depending on which gap is perceived to be dominant:
believers of idea gaps call for more interaction and communication with the developed countries, whereas those of
object gaps stress the importance of saving and accumulation.
2For example, the new growth theory holds the view that idea gap and its determinants are the more important
element in explaining economic development.
3See Joel Mokyr (1990).
4For example, David T. Coe and Elhanan Helpman (1995) and David T. Coe, Elhanan Helpman, and Alexander
W. Homaister (1997) single out international trade, particularly imports of machinery and equipment, as the main
channel of R & D spillovers. On the other hand, E. Borensztein, J. De Gregorio, and J-W. Lee (1998) emphasize the
interaction between human capital in the host country and foreign direct investment (FDI) in determining the success
of technology transfer. However, these papers fail to address the endogeneity of trade and FDI in a satisfactory way.
Recognizing that trade may be endogenous, Jerey A. Frankel and David Romer (1999) instrument it using geographic
characteristics of the countries. They nd no evidence that the OLS estimate of the eect of trade overstates the
causal eect. In fact, their IV estimate is always larger than the OLS estimate, a nding they attribute to sampling
error.
2neglecting disembodied idea ﬂows is undoubtedly due to measurement problems: how does one
measure disembodied ideas and their transmission? This paper addresses this problem by using
international telephone call trac as a proxy for disembodied idea ﬂows, and international trade
a sap r o x yf o re m b o d i e di d e aﬂ o w s .
Telephone call trac is denitely a rather crude measure of idea ﬂows. However, given that
international telephone calls are costly, the economizing behavior of economic agents would suggest
that such trac should contain valuable information. For instance, Richard Portes and H el ene
Rey (2000) have found telephone call trac to be an important associate of cross-country portfolio
equity investment ﬂows; it transmits informationacross national borders. More generally, telephone
call trac can be regarded as a proxy for the general extent of communication and contacts among
countries, which may in turn facilitate learning about best practices elsewhere.
To identify their eects on income, both trade and telephone call trac have to be instru-
mented because they may be endogenous: countries whose incomes are high for reasons other than
trade and telecommunication ﬂows may have higher trade shares and telephone call trac. There
is also a concern about reverse causality: richer countries may simply trade more and demand
more telecommunication, ceteris paribus. The instruments I use are measures of the geographic,
linguistic, and colonial components of countries' trade and telephone call trac abroad.
The geographic characteristics of a given country are exogenous. However, as the empirical
analysis later reveals, the same geographic factors that explain trade also explain telephone call
trac. Thus in using geographic factors to estimate trade's eect on income, it is necessary to
control for telephone call trac to avoid omitted variable bias, and vice versa. As for linguistic
and colonial factors, it is dicult to think of reasons that the match of two countries' linguistic
and colonial proles could have important eects on their income gaps except through their impact
on trade and communication. In particular, learning about better institutions (Hall and Jones,
31999) and adoption of dierent legal systems (La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, and Vishny,
1999) can be regarded as special cases of disembodied idea ﬂows. While the linguistic variable is
crucial in obtaining good instruments for trade and telephone call trac, the results turn out to
be insensitive to the inclusion of colonial ties.
The instruments are constructed along the line of Frankel and Romer (1999): rst, a bilateral
trade equation and a bilateral telephone call trac equation are estimated using bilateral geo-
graphic, linguistic, and colonial factors; next, the tted values of the equations are aggregated to
estimate the geographic, linguistic, and colonial components of countries' overall trade and tele-
phone call trac abroad. With these instruments, I can then distinguish the eects of embodied
and disembodied idea ﬂows on income: I estimate cross-country regressions of income per person on
international trade, international telephone call trac, and country size by instrumental variable.
There are four main ndings.
First, telephone call trac has a quantitatively large, though only moderately statistically
signicant, positive eect on income. Second, inclusion of telephone call trac with trade reduces
the IV estimate on trade by about three quarters in the baseline regression. The estimates imply
that a one standard deviation change in the logarithm of telephone call trac per worker explains
three times as much variation in the logarithm of income per worker as a one standard deviation
change in trade share. Third, the estimates are sensitive to the inclusion of the latitude variable: the
standard errors increase sharply; none of the coecient estimates remain statistically signicant,
either from zero or from the baseline estimates, at the conventional levels. Fourth, telephone call
trac bridges income gaps through idea gaps, rather than through object gaps. Thus, the evidence
provides relatively little support for the embodied object models when both trade and telephone
call trac are included in the regressions. Disembodied idea ﬂows emerge as the more important
factor in bridging income gaps and idea gaps.
4The remainder of this paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 discusses the basic framework and
derives the estimating equation. Section 3 constructs the instruments for both trade and telephone
call trac. With these instruments, section 4 distinguishes the eects of trade and telephone call
trac on income, and checks for robustness. Section 5 then determines whether the eects work
through idea gaps or object gaps. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Basic Framework
To distinguish the eects of trade and telephone call trac on income, this paper adopts the basic
framework of Frankel and Romer (1999). Frankel and Romer (1999) examine the causal eect of
trade on income using instruments constructed from a gravity model based only on geographic
factors. Their results suggest that trade has a quantitatively large and robust, though only mod-
erately statistically signicant, positive eect on income level. There are two reasons for adopting
their setup. First, their paper is the most careful empirical analysis to date in controlling for pos-
sible endogeneity of trade.5 Second, it is straightforward to extend their framework to construct
instruments for both trade and telephone call trac. The basic setup consists of the following
steps.
A. The Income Equation
First, the per capita income in country i is postulated to be a function of economic interactions
with the outside world (\international trade" and \international telephone call trac"), economic
interactionswithinthe country (\within-countrytrade"and \within-countrytelephone call trac"),
5In addition, as argued by Francisco Rodriguez and Dani Rodrik (2000), most of the other papers on trade and
openness can be shown to be non-robust. Note, however, that Frankel and Romer's paper has not been completely
exempted from criticisms. See, for example, Rodriguez and Rodrik (2000), pp54 { 56, for their comments on a
particular robustness issue in Frankel and Romer (1999).
5and other factors.
lnYi = 0 + 1Tradeinternational;i + 2lnTelinternational;i
+ 3Tradewithin;i + 4lnTelwithin;i + i; (1)
where Yi is income per worker, Tradeinternational;i and Telinternational;i are respectively international
trade share and international telephone call trac per worker, while Tradewithin;i and Telwithin;i
are respectively the within-country trade and the within-country telephone call trac. i is the
disturbance term.
B. Within-Country Interactions
Second, since the data on within-country trade and within-country telephone call trac are
unavailable, they are assumed to be functions of the country's size, measured by population and
area. In other words, larger size provides greater scope for within-country interaction because there
are more fellow citizens to interact with:
Tradewithin;i = 0 + 1lnNi + 2lnAi + !i; (2)
lnTelwithin;i = γ0 + γ1lnNi + γ2lnAi + i; (3)
where Ni is population and Ai is area.
C. The Estimating Equation
Substituting equations (2) and (3) into the income equation (1), I can express income per worker
as a function of international trade, international telephone call trac, population and size. This
yields the estimating equation:
lnYi = c0 + c1lnNi + c2lnAi + c3Tradeinternational;i + c4lnTelinternational;i + &i: (4)
6Equation (4) can be thought of as an extension of Michael Kremer's (1993) model of endogenous
technological change when idea diusion is costly. Kremer (1993)postulates that a large population
spurs technological change because it increases the number of potential inventors. However, even
if technology is nonrival, as Kremer (1993) assumes, its diusion may not be smooth and costless,
due to barriers such as geographic and linguistic dierences. If idea diusion is costly, then the
eective population for idea production for a country is neither limited to the size of its domestic
population, nor is it fully augmented by the world population. Instead, the eective population for
idea production for any country is its domestic population, augmented by its interactions with the
rest of the world through embodied and disembodied idea ﬂows, measured here by international
trade and international telephone call trac respectively.
3 The Instruments for Trade and Telephone Call Trac
3.1 Constructing the Instruments
Since both international trade and international telephone call trac may be endogenous, they have
to be instrumented. Frankel and Romer (1999) show that a country's geographic features, such
as its size and its proximity to other countries, have important eects on its bilateral and overall
trade. However, these geographic features should also be correlated with the volume of telephone
call trac among countries, as geography largely determines the ease of interaction among dierent
regions through much of history. Thus, to use these variables as instruments to identify trade's
eect on income, it is necessary to control for telephone call trac, and vice versa; otherwise, the
instruments constructed from these variables are invalid because they would be correlated with the
omitted variable contained in the error term.
While geographic variables may adequately explain the pattern of trade, they may be insucient
7to account for the pattern of telephone call trac. After all, a common language is the prerequisite
for verbal communication. Thus, the more likely that a randomly drawn person from one coun-
try speaks the same language as a randomly drawn person from another country, the higher the
interactions between these two countries should be. Finally, colonial ties may also be relevant for
the general pattern of interactions. To illustrate, consider the case of Singapore. Since Singapore
was a colony of the United Kingdom, there should be more interactions between Singapore and the
United Kingdom. However, this colonial tie should have no eect on Singapore's interactions with
other countries, say the United States or Japan.
Equally important, it is hard to think of reasons that the match of two countries' geographic,
linguistic, and colonial proles could have important eects on income except through their eects
on bilateral embodied and disembodied ﬂows. Thus, these bilateral geographic, linguistic, and
colonial variables can be used to obtain instrumental variables estimates of the impact of trade and
telephone call trac on income. To construct the instruments for trade and telephone call trac,
I adopt the two-stage framework used by Frankel and Romer (1999): rst, bilateral geographic,
linguistic, and colonial characteristics are used to predict bilateral trade shares and telephone call
trac per worker; next, the predicted values are aggregated over a country's trading or calling
partners. The aggregated values are the instruments for the country's overall trade shares and
telephone call trac per worker.
I. The Bilateral Prediction Equations
8More concretely, in the rst stage, the following bilateral regressions are estimated:
lnTradeij = a0 + a1lnDij + a2lnNi + a3lnAi + a4lnNj + a5lnAj + a6(Li + Lj)
+a7Bij + a8BijlnDij + a9BijlnNi + a10BijlnAi + a11BijlnNj
+a12BijlnAj + a13Bij(Li + Lj)+a14LANGUAGEij
+a15BRITAINij + a16FRANCEij + a17SPAINij + ij; (5)
lnTelij = b0 + b1lnDij + b2lnNi + b3lnAi + b4lnNj + b5lnAj + b6(Li + Lj)
+b7Bij + b8BijlnDij + b9BijlnNi + b10BijlnAi + b11BijlnNj
+b12BijlnAj + b13Bij(Li + Lj)+b14LANGUAGEij
+b15BRITAINij + b16FRANCEij + b17SPAINij + ij; (6)
where i refers to the home country and j denotes the destination country for trade or telephone
calls. Tradeij and Telij are respectively bilateral trade to GDP ratio and bilateral telephone call
trac per worker.6 The geographic variables are dened as follows: D is distance, N is population,
A is area, L is a dummy for landlocked countries, B indicates whether two countries share a common
border.
LANGUAGEij is the linguistic variable. It measures the probability that a randomly drawn
person from country i speaks the same languageas a randomly drawn person from country j. Specif-
ically, let pi;1;p i;2;:::;pi;100 denote the proportion of people who speak each of the top 100 languages
in country i. The probability that a randomly drawn person from country i speaks the same lan-
guage as a randomly drawn person from country j is simply LANGUAGEij =
P100
k=1 pi;kpj;k.T h e r e
are four points to note about the linguistic variable.
First, only the rst language or the mother tongue is considered.7 Second, only the one hundred
6The normalizations are with respect to the home country i.
7Thus, I ignore the fact that some people may be ﬂuent in more than one language. There are a few reasons for
9most widely used languages are considered.8 Third, unlike Hall and Jones (1999) who use only
European languages as instruments, I include many languages that are widely used and originate
from outside Europe. Using only European languages as instruments could incur a selection bias:
European countries and countries that consist mainly of emigrants from Europe tend to have
higher incomes per capita, perhaps for reasons unrelated to how linguistic proles facilitate idea
ﬂows. Finally, my linguistic measure is not merely a country specic constant, but varies across
country pairs i and j.
BRITAIN, FRANCE,a n dSPAIN are the colonial dummies that capture the greater in-
teractions between the ex-colonizers and their ex-colonies due to their colonial ties. Specically,
BRITAINij equals one if the two countries i and j are the United Kingdom and one of its ex-
colonies, and zero otherwise. FRANCE and SPAIN are similar dummies for France, Spain, and
their ex-colonies.
Data and Results
The data on bilateral telephone call trac come from International Telecommunication Union's
(ITU) Direction of Trac 1999. They are for 1985, and cover telephone call trac between nearly
200 countries. There are many missing values. I use all available data to estimate the bilateral
telephone call trac equation. The data on total international telephone call trac come from
considering only the rst language. First, the mother tongue of a person is more likely to be exogenous. On the other
hand, the second or third language that a person chooses to learn could be endogenous, driven in particular by the
expected economic gain from the command of such a language. Second, it is extremely hard to assess and measure a
person's prociency in the second or third language. Third, interaction and communication are most ecient in one's
mother tongue. Fourth, including second or third languages in the probability calculation presents a data problem:
conditional, rather than unconditional probabilities would have to be used.
8The practical diculty of including all languages is apparent. There are thousands of living languages in use
today. However, the error introduced by limiting the study to only the top one hundred languages is likely to be
very small. The reason is that in considering the eect of a common language on international interactions, we
are only interested in languages that are widely used. If a language is only used by a small group of people, or
by people concentrated in a given country, it is unlikely to have any eect on cross-border interactions. The 100
th
most commonly used language on our list is North Azerbaijani. It is used by about 7 million people worldwide.
About 6 millions (86 percent) of the users reside in Azerbaijan alone. The second and third largest group of users of
336,000 (4.8 percent) and 308,000 (4.4 percent) reside in Russia and Georgia respectively. Thus, it is unlikely that
any language below the top one hundred languages would have a signicant eect on cross-border interactions.
10ITU's World Telecommunication Indicators 1995. The data consist of both incoming and outgoing
telephone call trac. However, I use only the outgoing trac, as the data for most incoming trac
are unavailable.
The data on trade shares and geographic characteristics come from Frankel and Romer (1999).
The data are for the year 1985.9 The linguistic variable is calculated using data from Ethnologue
of the Summer Institute of Linguistics (SIL). Finally, the colonial dummies are compiled from The
World Factbook of the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA).10
Table 1 reports the OLS estimates of the bilateral regressions, equations (5) and (6). Essentially
all the coecients have the expected signs. The determinants have very similar qualitative eects
on both trade and telephone call trac, except for some of the interaction terms, which are mostly
not statistically signicant. Specically, bilateral trade and telephone call trac are lower if two
countries are further apart, if one of them is landlocked, or if their country sizes allow for more
internal interactions. On the other hand, bilateral interactions are higher if two countries share
a common border, a common language, or a colonial tie. For example, a one standard deviation
increase in the probability of a common language would raise telephone call trac per worker and
trade share by 15.06 percent and 8.29 percent respectively, ceteris paribus.11 Similarly, telephone
call trac per worker and trade share between Britain and any of its ex-colonies are expected to
9There are some minor errors that have been corrected here. These errors have not aected their results in any
substantial way. The errors are in their estimation sample. Their prediction sample is ne. Specically, the common
border variable was coded incorrectly between four pairs of countries (eight observations) in the estimation sample.
They are (Switzerland, Norway), (Denmark, Sweden), (Spain, France), and (Norway, Sweden). In addition, the area
variable for Saudi Arabia is coded dierently in the estimation sample and the prediction sample. I have realigned it
at the value used in the prediction sample, which is 865,000 square miles.
10See http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/index.html for the online version. For countries that have
been colonized by dierent countries, the ex-colonizer refers to the last of the colonizers. Some countries were placed
under the care of a particular country under UN-trusteeship during the transition from colonization to independence.
In that case, the caretaker country is taken to be the ex-colonizer here.
11This is calculated using the standard error of the probability of a common language in the full sample for which
data is available; it is equal to 0.0891 for 30,102 pairs of countries. However, the standard error is larger in the sample
used for estimation; it is equal to 0.1328. Using the latter standard error, a one standard deviation increase in the
probability of a common language would have raised bilateral telephone call trac and trade share by 22.44% and
12.35% instead.
11be roughly 38 and 4 times higher than otherwise.12
It is worth emphasizing that all the variables in equations (5) and (6) { except population and
area { are measured at the bilateral level, not the aggregate level. This is desirable because it is
even less likely that these bilateral, country-pair specic characteristics would correlate with the
aggregate error term i in the income equation (4).
II. The Aggregation Equations
In the second stage, the tted values from the bilateral trade and bilateral telephone call trac
equations are aggregated over each country's trading or calling partners to estimate the geographic{
linguistic{colonial components of a country's international trade and telephone call trac. First,
rewrite equations (5) and (6) as
lnTradeij = a0Xij + ij; (7)
lnTelij = b0Xij + ij; (8)
where a and b are the vectors of coecients in the bilateral regressions (5) and (6) respectively, and
Xij is the vector of geographic, linguistic, and colonial variables. The measures of the geographic{
linguistic{colonial component of country i's total trade share and telephone call trac per worker










where ^ a and ^ b are the vectors of coecient estimates reported in Table 1. Equations (9) and
(10) predict the components of countries' bilateral trade and telephone call trac that are at-
tributable to geographic characteristics, linguistic proles, and colonial history, and then ag-
12They are calculated as (e
3:67 − 1) and (e
1:59 − 1) respectively.
12gregate these components over all of a country's trading or calling partners to obtain the ex-
ogenous components of countries' overall trade and telephone call trac. These constructed
variables ( d Tradeinternational;i and ln d Telinternational;i) are my instruments for the actual variables
(Tradeinternational;i and lnTelinternational;i) in the estimating equation (4).
As Frankel and Romer (1999) point out, all that is needed to perform the calculations in
equations (9) and (10) are countries' geographic, linguistic, and colonial characteristics. I therefore
take the sum not just over the estimating sample, i.e., countries with data on bilateral trade and
telephone call trac, but over all countries in the world with data on the exogenous variables
Xij, including those with no data on bilateral trade or telephone call trac. The constructed
instruments are reported in Table 7 in the appendix.
3.2 Testing the Quality of the Instruments
This section tests the quality of the instruments constructed above. Frankel and Romer (1999)
argue that the component of the constructed trade share that is correlated with country size cannot
be used to estimate the eect of trade on income because it could be confounded by the within-
country interactions: a large country size promotes within-country interactions and discourages
between-country interactions at the same time, as a larger country is likely to be farther away
from the other countries. Thus, in using distance to construct instruments for between-country
interactions, it is necessary to control for country size. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 2 estimate the
rst stage regressions to investigate whether the constructed variables provide information beyond
that contained in country size. Figure 1 shows the partial correlation plot between actual and
constructed trade shares, controlling for the country's area and population size. Figure 2 shows a
smilar plot for actual and constructed telephone call trac.
The results show that the geographic{linguistic{colonial model produces good instruments for
13both trade and telephone call trac; the constructed variables do contain a considerable amount
of information about the actual variables beyond that contained in country size.
3.3 The Outliers
Nevertheless, Figure 1 reveals two large outliers { Luxembourg and Singapore { in the relationship
between actual and constructed trade share. They are the same outliers identied in Frankel and
Romer (1999). To examine robustness, columns (3) and (4) in Table 2 re-estimate the rst stage
regressions, omitting these outliers. Figures 3 and 4 show the partial plots. The plots still show
positive correlations between actual and constructed variables. Both partial correlations are still
statistically signicant at the 10 percent level. Thus, these correlations appear to be quite robust
to the outliers.
4 Trade or Telephone Call Trac? Embodied Idea Flows Versus
Disembodied Idea Flows
With the instruments, I can distinguish the relative importance of trade and telephone call trac {
corresponding conceptually to embodied versus disembodied idea ﬂows { in bridging income gaps.
In other words, I examine whether technological spillover works by expanding the variety of goods
available to the economy or by providing access to productive ideas generated elsewhere.
4.1 Basic Results
To identify the eects of trade and telephone call trac on incomes, I estimate equation (4),
reproduced below, by instrumental variables, where the instruments include the constant, lnNi,
14lnAi, d Tradeinternational;i,a n dln d Telinternational;i:13
lnYi = c0 + c1lnNi + c2lnAi + c3Tradeinternational;i + c4lnTelinternational;i + &i:
Table 3 reports the OLS and the IV regressions. The full sample consists of all 106 countries
for which data are available. All regressions control for two measures of size, namely, area and
population. Column (1) is an OLS regression. It shows that trade shares enter insignicantly when
telephone call trac is also included. The OLS estimate on trade share has a 95 percent condence
upper bound of 0.03, which is virtually zero. On the contrary, the coecient on telephone call trac
per worker is positive, and is economically and statistically signicant. A one percent increase in
the telephone call trac per worker is associated with a 0.52 percent rise in income per worker.
Columns (2) and (3) are the IV regressions. They dier in how the instruments for trade
shares and telephone call tac per worker are constructed: column (2) constructs the instruments
with only geographic and linguistic variables; column (3) includes the colonial variables in addition.
Both yield quantitativelyand qualitativelysimilarresults: trade share is not statisticallysignicant,
while telephone call trac is statistically signicant at the conventional levels.14
How does the estimated eect of trade on income compare to Frankel and Romer (1999)?
Frankel and Romer (1999) present a baseline IV estimate on trade share of 1.97, with a standard
error of 0.99 for the 150-country sample. This implies that a one-percentage-point increase in trade
share would raise income per worker by 2.0 percent. On the other hand, when the eect of telephone
call trac is controlled for, the baseline estimate in column (3) implies that the same increase in
13Throughout, the standard errors for the IV regressions are corrected to take into account the fact that the
instruments are constructed from the bilateral equations and hence depend on the parameters of the bilateral
equations. That is, the variance-covariance matrix of the coecients is estimated as the usual IV formula plus
(@^ c=@^ a)^ Ωaa(@^ c=@^ a)
0 +( @^ c=@^ b)^ Ωbb(@^ c=@^ b)
0,w h e r e^ a and ^ b are the coecient vectors in the bilateral trade and tele-
phone call trac regressions respectively, ^ c is the coecient vector in the nal income regression, ^ Ωaa and ^ Ωbb are the
estimated variance-covariance matrice of ^ a and ^ b respectively. For more details on standard error adjustment when
constructed regressors are used, see Paul A. Ruud (2000).
14In results not shown here, if one follows Frankel and Romer and uses only geographic variables in the bilateral
regressions, the instruments turn out not to be powerful enough to separate the eects of trade and communication
on income: the model as a whole is not statistically signicant; it has a model F-statistic equals 0.53.
15trade share would only advance income per worker by 0.5 percent, which is about a quarter of the
magnitude found in Frankel and Romer (1999).
Which is the more important determinant of output per worker? To determine the relative
importance of embodied versus disembodied idea ﬂows, the \beta coecients" are calculated by
multiplying the coecient estimate and the standard deviation of the corresponding explanatory
variable, and dividing the product by the standard deviation of the dependent variable. The
baseline estimates in column (3) imply a beta coecient of 0.22 for trade and 0.75 for telephone
call trac per worker. This means that a one standard deviation increase in trade share would lead
to a 0.22 standard deviation increase in the logarithm of output per worker. On the other hand, a
one standard deviation increase in the logarithm of telephone call trac per worker would explain
a 0.75 standard deviations increase in the logarithm of output per worker. Clearly, telephone call
trac or disembodied idea ﬂows are by far the more important force at work here.
Note that the eect of trade on income is not statistically signicant in this paper, not because
it is estimated less precisely { in fact, it has a smaller standard error than Frankel and Romer's
estimate { but because its point estimate becomes much smaller when the regression includes
telephone call trac. Thus, there appears to be relatively little support for the embodied object
models when both trade and telephone call trac are included in the regressions.
4.2 Robustness
A natural question is whether the results are robust. I evaluate robustness along three dimensions.
The rst concern is the possibility that the two outliers in the rst stage trade regression {
Luxembourg and Singapore { are driving the results.15 Table 4 reports the OLS and IV estimates
15As I argued earlier, this paper can be seen as an extension of the endogenous technological change model of
Kremer (1993) when idea diusion is costly. Essentially, trade and telephone call trac allow the individual country
to overcome the limitations of its small size by providing channels through which individual country could tap into
ideas generated elsewhere. Consequently, the relevant population for idea production for a given country is not only
its domestic residents, but is eectively augmented by the extent of its interactions with the rest of the world through
16when these two outliers are dropped from the income regression. Omitting the outliers generally
raises the coecient estimate on trade share and the standard errors of all estimates. All the IV
estimates have the expected sign. The IV estimate on trade share more than doubles, although
it is still not statistically signicant. On the other hand, the IV estimate on telephone call trac
changes little, although it is no longer statistically signicant.16
Second, if geography has an independent eect on income, for reasons unrelated to trade or
communication, then the IV estimates based on instruments constructed from geographic factors
may be biased. However, since the instruments are constructed at the bilateral level, it is hard
to imagine how they may systematically capture any independent eect geography might have on
income at the aggregate level. Nevertheless, two sets of geographic controls are used to check for
robustness.
The rst set of geographic controls includes three continent dummies: one for African countries,
one for Latin American countries, and one for Asian countries. Columns (1) and (2) in Table 5
re-estimate the OLS and IV regressions including these continent dummies. Trade share is still not
statistically signicant; telephone call trac, on the other hand, remains statistically signicant
with the correct sign. However, the results do not rule out the possibility that geographic factors
may have an independent eect on income at the aggregate level: the African dummy is negative
and statistically signicant; the Latin America dummy enters negatively and the Asian dummy
positively, although both are not statistically signicant.
The second geographic control is a country's distance from the equator. The OLS and IV
trade and telephone call trac. Thus, unlike other papers on cross-country economic growth, small countries such as
Luxembourg and Singapore should really be included in the sample, as they would benet the most from embodied
and disembodied idea ﬂows from abroad. In the context of the model, they are not outliers, but are the very countries
that the model seeks to explain.
16Note that in calculating the adjusted standard errors in this table, the bilateral regressions have been calculated
using all available observations. The outliers are omitted only in the second stage. Had all calculations been performed
excluding the outliers, the coecient estimate on trade share in column (3) would have been 1.26, with standard
errors equal to 1.38. Similarly, under the alternative calculation, the coecient estimate on telephone call trac
would have been 0.31, with standard errors equal to 0.25.
17estimates are reported in columns (3) and (4) in Table 5. Although the OLS estimates remain
largely unchanged, the IV estimates become highly erratic: the standard errors of the estimates
increase substantially; none of the coecients remain statistically signicant. However, given the
large standard errors, one cannot reject the hypothesis that these coecients are equal to the
baseline estimates. Douglas A. Irwin and Marko Tervi¨ o (2001) encounter the same problem when
they replicate Frankel and Romer's estimates using historical data on income and trade. They
point out that since latitude does not have a natural economic interpretation, it is not clear what
this result means. In particular, the mechanisms through which latitude might aect economic
performance remain unclear.
Finally, independent of trade and communication, countries populated by European emigrants
and their descendants may simply have higher income. Columns (5) and (6) re-estimate the baseline
regression including two measure of languages used in Hall and Jones (1999): the fraction of
the population speaking English as the rst language, and the fraction speaking English, French,
Spanish, German, or Portuguese as the rst language. The coecients on trade share and telephone
call trac per worker change little, although they have each become statistically insignicant.
However, the test for the joint signicance of trade and telephone call trac yields an F-statistic of
5.00, which is statistically signicant. Neither of the linguistic measures are individually or jointly
signicant; the test for joint signicance of the linguistic variables yields an F-statistic of 0.43.
4.3 Further Discussions
La Porta et al. (1999) and Hall and Jones (1999) also employ various geographic, linguistic, and
colonial variables to construct instruments in their empirical analyses: La Porta et al. (1999) use
historical variables to investigate the eect of legal origins on variations in government performance
across countries; Hall and Jones (1999) use geographic and linguistic variables to study whether
18\social infrastructure" causes cross-country income dierences.17 These two papers can be related
to my paper in two aspects.
First, the adoption of dierent legal systems and social infrastructure can be seen as specic
examples of disembodied idea ﬂows. Thus, this paper investigates how much disembodied idea
ﬂows in general explain cross-country income dierences.
Second, although my paper also uses geographic, linguistic, and colonial variables, it diers
from La Porta et al. (1999) and Hall and Jones (1999) in how the instruments are constructed:
Frankel and Romer (1999) and I construct the instruments at the bilateral level; La Porta et al.
(1999) and Hall and Jones (1999), however, do it at the aggregate level. Consequently, there is
a fundamental dierence in the types and forms of geographic, linguistic, and colonial variables
used. All the geographic, linguistic, and colonial variables used in this paper are specic to the
country pairs. Constructing the instruments at the bilateral level is preferable since it is even more
dicult to imagine how these country-pair specic geographic, linguistic, and colonial variables
could correlate with the error in the aggregate income regression.
5 The Channels Through Which Trade and Telephone Call Trac
Aect Income: Idea Gaps Versus Object Gaps
Following the lead of Frankel and Romer (1999), this section investigates the channels through
which trade and telephone call trac aect income using a two-step channel accounting exercise:
rst, following Hall and Jones (1999), income per worker is decomposed into three components,
i.e., contributions from physical capital per worker, human capital per worker, and total factor






where  is set to 1/3, Y is income, L is labor, K is physical capital, H is human capital, and A is
total factor productivity; next, each component of income is regressed on trade and telephone call
trac, controlling for population and area.18
Table 6 reports the OLS and IV estimates from the channel accounting exercise. The IV
estimates reveal that trade aects income mainly through aggregate factor accumulation, although
none of the individual channels are statistically signicant. In contrast, communication advances
income predominantly through totalfactor productivity, although the estimate is barely statistically
signicant at the ten percent level. Telephone call trac has virtually no eect on aggregate factor
accumulation. The last row in Table 6 reports the test statistics for the joint signicance of trade
share and telephone call trac per worker. Based on these statistics, the hypothesis that trade
share and telephone call trac have no eect on TFP accumulation can be rejected. However, there
is little evidence that trade share and telephone call trac per worker have a jointly signicant
eect on physical capital and human capital accumulation. Summarizing, it appears that it is
disembodied idea ﬂows, not embodied idea ﬂows, that help bridge income gaps; furthermore, these
ﬂows operate through idea gaps, not object gaps.
6C o n c l u s i o n
This paper empirically distinguishes between the relative importance of embodied versus disem-
bodied idea ﬂows in closing income gaps and idea gaps. Specically, I use trade share and telephone
call trac per worker as proxies for embodied and disembodied idea ﬂows respectively. However,
18For more details on the methodology and interpretation of channel accounting, see Wei-Kang Wong (2001).
20since trade and telephone call trac are likely to be endogenous, to identify their eects on income,
they have to be instrumented.
To construct the instruments, I rst predict the bilateral trade share and telephone call trac
per worker based on the country-pair specic geographic, linguistic, and colonial characteristics. I
then aggregate these predicted values to derive the instruments { the geographic, linguistic, and
colonial components of countries' overall trade and telephone call trac abroad. The results suggest
that linguistic similarity is a crucial determinant of cross-border interactions. Because the same
exogenous variables explain both trade and telephone call trac, to use these variables to identify
trade's eect on income, the regression needs to control for telephone call trac, and vice versa;
otherwise, the estimates would be biased.
The IV estimates obtained with these instruments suggest that telephone call trac has an
economically much larger eect on income per worker than trade. Furthermore, trade's eect on
income is reduced greatly when the telephone call trac is controlled for. The eect of telephone call
trac seems to work through total factor productivity rather than aggregate factor accumulation.
Thus, telephone call trac, not trade, emerges as the main channel of technology transfer. There is
relatively little empirical support for the embodied object models when measures of both embodied
and disembodied idea ﬂows are included in the regressions.
The estimated impact of telephone call trac on cross-country income has some stability across
dierent specications. However, the results are sensitive to the inclusion of the latitude variable:
the latitude variable raises the standard errors of all estimates substantially; none of the variables
remain statistically signicant, from zero or from the baseline estimates.
Several issues remain to be resolved in future works. First, some papers, such as Coe, Helpman,
and Homaister (1997), argue that the type of trade matters. In particular, since the aim is to
measure embodied idea ﬂows with trade, it will be interesting to see if the above results change
21signicantly if trade in machinery and equipment is used instead. Second, this paper ignores
the interplay between trade and telephone call trac. The interaction between embodied and
disembodied idea ﬂows is an interesting topic for future research. Finally, more work is required to
understand the meaning of the latitude variable in economic development; theoretical and empirical
works that shed light on its mechanisms of operation would be desirable.
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ln (Distance) -1.38 -0.84
(0.06) (0.03)
ln (Population in Country i) -0.32 -0.24
(0.04) (0.03)
ln (Area in Country i) -0.22 -0.13
(0.03) (0.02)
ln (Population in Country j) 0.70 0.61
(0.04) (0.03)
ln (Area in Country j) -0.13 -0.19
(0.03) (0.02)
Landlocked Dummy -1.20 -0.32
(0.12) (0.07)
Common Border Dummy 6.82 4.31
(2.29) (2.24)
Common Border Dummy * ln (Distance) -0.35 0.26
(0.37) (0.38)
Common Border Dummy * ln (Population in i) -0.60 -0.28
(0.24) (0.21)
Common Border Dummy * ln (Area in i) 0.26 -0.07
(0.22) (0.18)
Common Border Dummy * ln (Population in j) -0.20 -0.11
(0.20) (0.22)
Common Border Dummy * ln (Area in j) -0.03 -0.09
(0.18) (0.19)
Common Border Dummy * Landlocked Dummy 1.65 0.37
(0.34) (0.22)
Prob (i and j Speak the Same Language) 1.69 0.93
(0.26) (0.23)
Dummy for Britain and its ex-colonies 3.67 1.59
(0.29) (0.18)
Dummy for France and its ex-colonies 3.64 1.81
(0.13) (0.40)




Sample Size 3052 3220
Note: Heteroskedasticity-consistent standard errors are in parentheses.
24Table 2: The Relations Between Actual and Constructed International Trade and Telephone Call
Trac
Dependent Variable
Regressors lnTeli Tradei lnTeli Tradei
Entire Sample Outliers Omitted
constant 1.83 1.62 1.60 1.35
(1.78) (0.27) (2.05) (0.25)
lnPopulationi -0.09 -0.05 -0.11 -0.06
(0.14) (0.02) (0.15) (0.02)
lnAreai -0.03 -0.06 0.01 -0.03
(0.12) (0.02) (0.14) (0.02)
d Tradei 0.93 0.51 0.88 0.64
(0.92) (0.16) (1.77) (0.25)
d lnTeli 0.41 -0.004 0.42 -0.005
(0.23) (0.04) (0.25) (0.03)
R2 0.27 0.52 0.23 0.54
Adj. R2 0.24 0.51 0.20 0.52
Sample Size 106 150 104 148
First Stage F Statistica 4.12 6.58 3.07 5.03
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.
a This is the F statistic testing the hypothesis that the coecients on constructed trade share and telephone call
trac are jointly zero.
25Table 3: Trade, Telephone Call Trac, and Income (Full Sample)
Dependent Variable: ln (GDP per worker at 1985)
Regressors (1) (2) (3)
OLS IVm IVl
constant 6.83 6.40 6.09
(0.38) (1.32) (1.43)
ln (Population) 0.16 0.14 0.14
(0.03) (0.05) (0.05)
ln (Area) 0.01 0.05 0.07
(0.03) (0.09) (0.09)
Trade Share -0.25 0.27 0.47
(0.14) (0.87) (0.86)
ln (Telephone Trac per Worker) 0.52 0.40 0.38
(0.03) (0.20) (0.17)
R2 0.81 0.76 0.73
Sample Size 106 106 106
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors have been adjusted to take into account of the fact
that the instruments have been estimated and hence depend on the parameter estimates of the bilateral regressions.
m The instruments used are the predicted trade share and the logarithm of predicted telephone call trac per capita
from the geographic{linguistic model, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of area.
l The instruments used are the predicted trade share and the logarithm of predicted telephone call trac per capita
from the geographic{linguistic{colonial model, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of area.
26Table 4: Trade, Telephone Call Trac, and Income (Outliers Omitted)
Dependent Variable: ln (GDP per worker at 1985)
Regressors (1) (2) (3)
OLS IVm IVl
constant 6.93 5.42 4.98
(0.41) (2.10) (2.21)
ln (Population) 0.15 0.18 0.18
(0.04) (0.07) (0.07)
ln (Area) 0.01 0.08 0.11
(0.03) (0.10) (0.11)
Trade Share -0.32 0.77 1.21
(0.18) (1.38) (1.41)
ln (Telephone Trac per Worker) 0.53 0.41 0.33
(0.03) (0.23) (0.23)
R2 0.80 0.72 0.61
Sample Size 104 104 104
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors have been adjusted to take into account of the fact
that the instruments have been estimated and hence depend on the parameter estimates of the bilateral regressions.
m The instruments used are the predicted trade share and the logarithm of predicted telephone call trac per capita
from the geographic{linguistic model, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of area.
l The instruments used are the predicted trade share and the logarithm of predicted telephone call trac per capita
from the geographic{linguistic{colonial model, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of area.
27Table 5: Trade, Telephone Call Trac, and Income { Robustness Checks
Dependent Variable: ln (GDP per worker at 1985)
Regressors (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
constant 7.44 7.41 6.89 8.37 6.83 5.99
(0.31) (1.07) (0.38) (3.77) (0.39) (1.59)
ln (Population) 0.06 0.06 0.13 -0.11 0.16 0.14
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04) (0.43) (0.03) (0.05)
ln (Area) 0.05 0.05 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.07
(0.02) (0.05) (0.03) (0.15) (0.03) (0.10)
Trade Share -0.25 -0.22 -0.22 0.46 -0.24 0.61
(0.11) (0.42) (0.14) (1.60) (0.15) (1.04)
ln (Telephone Trac/Worker) 0.45 0.45 0.48 -0.11 0.52 0.32
(0.03) (0.11) (0.03) (1.04) (0.03) (0.23)
African Dummy -0.66 -0.67
(0.11) (0.30)
Latin America Dummy -0.13 -0.14
(0.10) (0.18)
Asian Dummy 0.31 0.30
(0.11) (0.21)




English, French, German, 0.01 0.37
Spanish or Portuguese (0.14) (0.44)
R
2 0.90 0.90 0.81 0.21 0.81 0.70
Sample Size 106 106 106 106 106 106
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors have been adjusted to take into account of the fact
that the instruments have been estimated and hence depend on the parameter estimates of the bilateral regressions.
The instruments used are the predicted trade share and the logarithm of predicted telephone call trac per capita
from the geographic{linguistic{colonial model, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of area.




(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
OLS IV OLS IV OLS IV
constant -0.44 -1.02 -0.02 -0.53 7.15 6.52
(0.20) (0.89) (0.19) (0.79) (0.42) (1.39)
ln (Population) 0.05 0.03 0.08 0.07 0.12 0.11
(0.02) (0.03) (0.02) (0.03) (0.04) (0.05)
ln (Area) 0.01 0.07 -0.02 0.03 -0.05 -0.003
(0.02) (0.06) (0.02) (0.06) (0.04) (0.10)
Trade Share 0.003 0.53 -0.05 0.41 -0.22 0.19
(0.072) (0.50) (0.07) (0.46) (0.15) (0.83)
ln (Telephone Trac 0.11 -0.002 0.12 0.03 0.32 0.27
per worker) (0.01) (0.09) (0.01) (0.09) (0.03) (0.16)
R2 0.44 - 0.56 0.16 0.59 0.56
Sample Size 91 91 91 91 91 91
SE of regression 0.21 0.30 0.20 0.27 0.45 0.47
F-statistica - 1.07 - 1.39 - 3.95
Note: Standard errors are in parentheses. The standard errors have been adjusted to take into account of the fact
that the instruments have been estimated and hence depend on the parameter estimates of the bilateral regressions.
The instruments used are the predicted trade share and the logarithm of predicted telephone call trac per capita
from the geographic{linguistic{colonial model, the logarithm of population, and the logarithm of area.
a This is the F-statistic testing the hypothesis that the coecients on trade share and ln (telephone call trac per
worker) are jointly zero.
29Table 7: Data Appendix
Actual Constructed ln (Actual Telephone ln (Constructed Telephone
Country Code Trade Share Trade Share Call Trac per Worker) Call Trac per Worker)
ALGERIA DZA 0.50 0.15 2.84 2.40
BENIN BEN 0.77 0.35 0.33 4.44
BOTSWANA BWA 1.21 0.22 2.76 3.96
CAMEROON CMR 0.58 0.15 1.79 1.82
CENTRAL AFR.R. CAF 0.65 0.15 -0.56 1.76
CHAD TCD 0.61 0.12 -1.90 1.31
COMOROS COM 0.67 0.48 0.54 3.48
DJIBOUTI DJI 1.17 0.70 3.00 4.15
EGYPT EGY 0.52 0.12 0.67 1.61
ETHIOPIA ETH 0.34 0.08 -2.16 0.44
GAMBIA GMB 0.89 0.48 0.22 4.11
IVORY COAST CIV 0.78 0.16 1.39 1.96
KENYA KEN 0.52 0.12 0.20 1.43
LESOTHO LSO 1.52 0.21 1.61 2.50
MALAWI MWI 0.54 0.13 -0.26 1.18
MALI MLI 0.74 0.13 0.19 1.77
MAURITIUS MUS 1.09 0.32 1.51 2.95
MOROCCO MAR 0.58 0.14 2.24 2.21
NIGER NER 0.51 0.13 -0.40 1.97
NIGERIA NGA 0.29 0.08 -0.20 1.51
RWANDA RWA 0.31 0.25 -2.09 3.04
SENEGAL SEN 0.71 0.19 1.24 2.43
SEYCHELLES SYC 1.12 0.88 3.13 4.39
SIERRA LEONE SLE 0.19 0.26 -0.49 3.29
SOUTH AFRICA ZAF 0.55 0.09 2.23 1.24
TANZANIA TZA 0.21 0.11 -0.75 1.16
TUNISIA TUN 0.71 0.26 2.64 3.15
ZAMBIA ZMB 0.77 0.14 1.01 2.15
BAHAMAS BHS 1.24 0.39 5.67 3.34
BELIZE BLZ 1.83 0.95 2.84 5.07
CANADA CAN 0.54 0.06 4.49 0.97
COSTA RICA CRI 0.63 0.33 2.85 3.51
DOMINICA DMA 1.03 0.78 3.32 4.40
EL SALVADOR SLV 0.52 0.39 2.58 3.98
GRENADA GRD 1.21 0.85 3.36 4.60
GUATEMALA GTM 0.25 0.24 2.08 3.08
HONDURAS HND 0.54 0.40 2.30 4.27
MEXICO MEX 0.26 0.05 1.76 0.17
continued on next page
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0Table 7: continued
Actual Constructed ln (Actual Telephone ln (Constructed Telephone
Country Code Trade Share Trade Share Call Trac per Worker) Call Trac per Worker)
NICARAGUA NIC 0.37 0.34 2.12 4.03
PANAMA PAN 0.71 0.31 3.40 3.15
TRINIDAD&TOBAGO TTO 0.62 0.31 4.06 3.06
U.S.A. USA 0.18 0.03 3.38 0.24
ARGENTINA ARG 0.17 0.07 1.41 1.59
BOLIVIA BOL 0.30 0.09 0.28 1.02
BRAZIL BRA 0.19 0.03 0.27 -1.18
CHILE CHL 0.54 0.09 1.15 1.03
COLOMBIA COL 0.26 0.10 1.50 1.23
ECUADOR ECU 0.48 0.14 1.52 1.81
PARAGUAY PRY 0.50 0.10 1.65 1.42
PERU PER 0.39 0.08 0.71 0.76
SURINAME SUR 0.83 0.28 2.87 2.80
URUGUAY URY 0.48 0.21 2.58 3.97
VENEZUELA VEN 0.41 0.11 2.52 1.40
BAHRAIN BHR 1.89 0.74 5.27 4.38
CHINA CHN 0.19 0.02 -2.47 -1.21
HONG KONG HKG 2.10 0.37 3.82 2.94
INDIA IND 0.15 0.03 -2.40 -0.49
INDONESIA IDN 0.43 0.04 -0.93 -0.36
IRAN IRN 0.15 0.09 1.08 0.71
IRAQ IRQ 0.49 0.19 1.18 2.13
ISRAEL ISR 0.86 0.48 3.25 3.97
JAPAN JPN 0.26 0.05 1.21 0.28
KOREA, REP. KOR 0.68 0.15 0.95 2.34
KUWAIT KWT 0.96 0.42 4.43 3.37
LAOS LAO 0.14 0.26 -2.57 2.84
MALAYSIA MYS 1.05 0.16 1.12 1.72
NEPAL NPL 0.31 0.13 -1.94 1.06
OMAN OMN 0.87 0.31 3.47 2.76
PHILIPPINES PHL 0.46 0.08 0.58 0.93
QATAR QAT 0.81 0.65 5.03 4.14
SAUDI ARABIA SAU 0.80 0.14 4.23 1.43
SINGAPORE SGP 3.18 0.49 4.43 3.52
SYRIA SYR 0.37 0.38 1.74 4.41
THAILAND THA 0.51 0.09 -0.52 0.86
UNITED ARAB E. ARE 0.90 0.32 5.11 3.00
AUSTRIA AUT 0.81 0.40 4.46 3.60
continued on next page
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1Table 7: continued
Actual Constructed ln (Actual Telephone ln (Constructed Telephone
Country Code Trade Share Trade Share Call Trac per Worker) Call Trac per Worker)
BELGIUM BEL 1.51 0.51 4.63 3.82
BULGARIA BGR 0.86 0.28 1.06 2.56
CYPRUS CYP 1.08 0.57 4.44 4.12
CZECHOSLOVAKIA CSK 0.69 0.20 1.33 2.23
DENMARK DNK 0.73 0.29 4.36 2.61
FINLAND FIN 0.57 0.20 3.76 2.10
FRANCE FRA 0.47 0.19 3.73 2.61
GERMANY, WEST DEU 0.62 0.17 4.18 1.95
GREECE GRC 0.54 0.25 3.64 2.20
HUNGARY HUN 0.82 0.26 2.07 2.81
ICELAND ISL 0.82 0.32 4.31 2.50
IRELAND IRL 1.19 0.91 3.04 6.45
ITALY ITA 0.46 0.13 3.20 1.33
LUXEMBOURG LUX 2.12 2.46 6.24 6.56
MALTA MLT 1.61 1.07 4.04 5.30
NETHERLANDS NLD 1.19 0.35 4.52 3.23
NORWAY NOR 0.86 0.22 4.46 2.20
POLAND POL 0.35 0.13 0.63 1.44
PORTUGAL PRT 0.78 0.18 2.50 1.84
ROMANIA ROM 0.42 0.17 0.54 1.83
SPAIN ESP 0.44 0.12 2.77 1.39
SWEDEN SWE 0.69 0.17 4.40 1.92
SWITZERLAND CHE 0.78 0.33 5.42 2.64
TURKEY TUR 0.44 0.11 1.10 0.93
U.K. GBR 0.57 0.26 3.81 3.66
YUGOSLAVIA YUG 0.58 0.24 2.22 2.20
AUSTRALIA AUS 0.35 0.05 3.27 0.27
FIJI FJI 0.89 0.19 2.55 2.00
NEW ZEALAND NZL 0.65 0.09 3.68 1.43
SOLOMON IS. SLB 1.24 0.26 1.81 2.41
3
2Figure 1: Partial Correlation Between Actual and Constructed Trade Share Using All Available
Observations
Figure 2: Partial Correlation Between Actual and Constructed Telephone Call Trac Using All
Available Observations
33Figure 3: Partial Correlation Between Actual and Constructed Trade Share with Outliers Omitted
Figure 4: Partial Correlation Between Actual and Constructed Telephone Call Trac with Outliers
Omitted
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